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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENEVA MELDRUM 
Plaintiff-Respondent , 
_vs . \ Case No. 
KLARENCE MELDRUM \ 13684 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
A reading of respondent's brief evokes the questions: 
Wherein has respondent made answer to any of the seven 
points of alleged error set forth in appellant's brief? Which 
one of defendant's points is claimed to be incorrect? And 
why? 
Defendant set forth in his brief the following Proposi-
tions: 
That plaintiff claimed in her complaint (R.6) that 
the 1964 contract between plaintiff and defendant 
was superseded by the Rasmussen contract, and 
defendant in his answer denied this. 
That in her complaint plaintiff alleged that she 
was entitled to receive 65.81 of sums received and 
to be received under the Rasmussen contract on the 
half interest in the ranch covered by her 1964 
contract with defendant. That defendant in his 
answer denied this and contended that the rights of 
plaintiff and defendant were fixed by the 1964 
contract. 
That plaintiff's claim amounted to the sum of 
$49,390.00, exclusive of interest, costs and attorney 
fees. That under the 1964 contract plaintiff's entitle-
ment from sale of the ranch amounted to $17,525.00, 
exclusive of interest or costs to either party. That 
the difference between the two claims amounted to 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$31,865.00 exclusive of interest or costs to either 
party. 
That the trial court decided against the plaintiff 
on these issues (R.87) and declared that the 1964 
contract was not modified, amended, merged or 
novated by the Rasmussen contract. 
That at the time of commencement of this action 
defendant was not in default under the 1964 
contract, and that the evidence at trial proves this. 
That prior to commencement of this action 
defendant made offers in writing to permit plaintiff 
to receive from the .escrow agent sums greatly in 
excess of installments required under the 1964 
contract and plaintiff rejected such offers. 
That defendant offered proof at trial of such 
offers and the plaintiff objected to such offers and 
the court sustained the objection. 
That the 1964 contract between plaintiff and 
defendant provided that the purchase price did not 
bear interest except in case of default and then at 
only three per cent per annum. 
That the 1964 contract provided that, in event of 
default of either party and action brought for en-
forcement, the party not at fault should be awarded 
costs and attorney fee. That the court failed to give 
effect to this provision. 
That the trial court mis-interpreted an extension 
agreement (R-68) and awarded plaintiff interest to 
which she was not entitled. 
That the defendant offered documentary evi-
dence to prove certain payments made to plaintiff 
by the escrow agent, and the court sustained 
plaintiff's objections to such evidence and also 
sustained plaintiff's objections to defendant's 
request for a continuance. 
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Defendant submits that each and all of the foregoing 
propositions are shown by the record and evidence herein 
to be true. Also that appellant's former brief sets forth 
references to the record which sustain these propositions. 
It is further submitted that respondent's brief does not 
contain any citation or reference to the record which 
disproves any of said propositions nor any citation or point 
of law which supports plaintiff's objections to the 
relevance and materiality of such propositions. 
On page 8 of respondent's brief, counsel states: 
"The court made no finding that the defendant was 
in default on the contract at the time of commence-
ment of the action, and did not need to do so." 
A study of plaintiff's complaint and the answer and 
counterclaim of defendant shows the utter fallacy of such 
arguement—and the necessity of giving consideration to 
the propositions atjove mentioned and to the points made 
in appellant's former brief. 
In Point III of respondent's brief it is argued that the 
offering of a pre-trial settlement of a claim is not admissi-
ble in evidence at a trail. And counsel cites authorities to 
support that argument. Counsel then asks this court to 
declare irrelevant the evidence offered by defendant to 
show that prior to commencment of this action he had 
made written offer (Exhibits D-l, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, Tr. 57) 
to permit plaintiff to receive from the escrow agent 
payments greatly in excess of installments required of 
defendant under the 1964 contract. Plaintiff's reference to 
such offers as "compromise offers" is wholly erroneous. A 
reading of the exhibits referred to will show that they were 
unconditional, unequivocal offers and that plaintiff's re-
jection and subsequent commencement of this action 
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against the defendant was entirely unjust and un-
warranted. 
In point IV of respondent's brief it is argued that the 
reviewing court should respect the trial court's findings 
unless there is a preponderance of evidence to the 
contrary. That is certainly no answer to Point IV of 
appellant's brief in which it is contended that the trial 
court erred in failing to make findings as to payments 
made by defendant on his contract nor to Point V in which 
defendant contends that the court erred in its interpreta-
tion of a written agreement for extension of time (R-68). 
Also it is no answer to defendant's allegation that the court 
erred in awarding interest to plaintiff in derogation of 
defendant's rights under the language of the 1964 
contract. A reviewing court has a duty to review a trial 
court's interpretation of written instruments, and defend-
ant submits that a reading of the documents referred to 
will conclusively show the merit of defendant's contention 
of error. 
Point V of respondent's brief is directed against Point VI 
of appellant's brief in which defendant contends that the 
court erred in denying defendant judgment for interest 
and costs and attorney fees. Plaintiff's response to this is 
that ' Inasmuch as the court found against the defendant 
then it must of necessity not award defendant his costs and 
attorney fee." 
In answer to this, defendant unequivocally asserts that 
the court did not decide against the defendant on the main 
issues in this case. The main issue was on plaintiff's claim 
that the 1964 contract between plaintiff and defendant was 
superseded by the Rasmussen contract. That issue was 
decided against the plaintiff (R-87) and that decision then 
called for a correct interpretation of the 1964 contract. 
That contract in plain terms negatived plaintiff's claim for 
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interest and gave defendant a rightful claim to costs and 
attorney fees in this case. And the extension agreement 
relied upon by plaintiff contained no language whatever 
which gave plaintiff a right to interest as claimed by 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's Point VI is an attempted answer to Point VII 
of defendant's brief in which defendant complains of the 
court's rulings sustaining plaintiff's objections to intro-
duction of defendant's exhibits D-6 and D-7 which 
defendant offered to prove certain payments made to 
plaintiff by Walker Bank as escrow agent, also that the 
court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objections to defend-
ant's motion for a continuance to permit defendant to call 
witnesses to prove the making of such payments by the 
escrow agent. 
Defendant maintains that the exhibits mentioned were 
not irrelevant or incompetent, and that plaintiff's objec-
tions should not have been sustained. And, when the court 
rejected the documents and defendant moved for a 
continuance to permit testimony from the escrow agent, 
the plaintiff's objection to such continuance was arbitrary, 
and should not have been allowed. Counsel for plaintiff 
argues in his brief that the case had been set for trial on 
that day and that defendant should have had his witnesses 
present. The record shows that the case had not been set 
for trial on that day but came on for hearing on defendant's 
motion for ruling upon legal issues and upon objections to 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (See 
Reporter's Transcript B pages 1 and 8-16). After the 
parties were unable to agree upon items of payment made 
by the escrow agent, the court called for trial of the issues 
at 1:30 p.m. of that day. When plaintiff objected to 
documents received from the escrow agent showing cer-
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tain payments, the court should have overruled the 
objection or granted defendant's motion for a continuance. 
In conclusion the appellant asserts that the points made 
in his former brief and the propositions hereinabove set 
forth are fully sustained by the record and evidence and 
that nothing is shown in the answering brief of respondent 
which justifies a denial of the relief prayed for in 
defendant's counterclaim and in appelant's former brief. 
Respectively submitted, 
Will L. Hoyt 
Attorney for Defendant-
Apellant 
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